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CONNICK V. THOMPSON:
SACRIFICING DETERRENCE AND
REPARATIONS IN THE NAME OF AVOIDING
RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR LIABILITY
Allison Chan*
Death is the ultimate punishment because of its finality; once it is
carried out, it can never be revoked. John Thompson came close to this
ultimate punishment because a prosecutor failed to turn over
exculpatory evidence under the principles that the U.S. Supreme Court
enunciated in Brady v. Maryland. In Connick v. Thompson, the Court
overturned Thompson’s $14 million award for spending eighteen years
in prison (fourteen of those on death row) because previous Brady
violations by the Orleans District Attorney’s Office were not enough to
put the district attorney on notice regarding the need for further
training on Brady’s principles and because the need for training was
not so obvious that the district attorney’s office could be held liable
under the failure-to-train theory. The Court’s holding is detrimental
because an entire district attorney’s office may now be shielded from
civil liability in the event of a Brady violation and because individuals
like Thompson will have no recourse for spending time in prison due to
prosecutorial misconduct. The Court’s holding discourages prosecutors
from turning over exculpatory evidence, thus reducing prosecutorial
accountability, and runs counter to the deeply rooted American
principle that every person has the right to a fair trial.


* J.D. Candidate, May 2012, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., 2009, University of
California, Los Angeles. I would like to extend a special thank you to Deputy Federal Public
Defender Gail Ivens for her invaluable guidance, insight, and support.
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“[I]t would take a miracle to avoid this execution.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
After Louisiana death row inmate John Thompson successfully
delayed six previous execution dates, the state set his seventh
execution date for May 20, 1999.2 Thompson’s attorneys flew in
from Philadelphia to deliver the news in person, rather than have him
hear it from prison officials.3
But in late April 1999, with less than one month to go until
execution, Thompson got his miracle. A private investigator whom
Thompson’s lawyers had hired discovered an exculpatory crime lab
report in the depths of the New Orleans Police Crime Laboratory.4
After eighteen years in prison, fourteen of which were on death row,5
Thompson succeeded in overturning his convictions6 because the
district attorney who tried the case “intentionally suppressed blood
evidence . . . that in some way exculpated [Thompson].”7
Thompson thereafter brought an action against the Orleans
Parish District Attorney’s Office under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.8 After
granting certiorari on the issue of whether a district attorney’s office
may be held liable under § 1983 for failure to train9 based on a single
Brady violation,10 the U.S. Supreme Court held in Connick v.
Thompson11 that four prior unrelated Brady violations by prosecutors
in the district attorney’s office12 did not put the office on notice of
the need to further train.13 Further, the Court held that Thompson

1. John Thompson, Op-Ed., The Prosecution Rests, but I Can’t, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2011,
at WK11.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1356 (2011).
5. Id. at 1355.
6. Id. at 1356–57.
7. Id. at 1356 n.1 (internal quotation marks omitted) (referencing exhibits entered into
evidence).
8. Id. at 1357.
9. The failure-to-train theory reflects a local government’s decision to not train employees
about the legal duty to avoid violating a citizen’s constitutional rights. Id. at 1359.
10. Id. at 1356; see infra note 40.
11. 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011).
12. Louisiana courts, in the years prior to Thompson’s legal proceedings, had overturned
four convictions due to Brady violations by prosecutors in the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s
Office. Id. at 1360.
13. Id.
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could not recover under a “single-incident” liability theory because
the nondisclosure of blood evidence that had resulted in his wrongful
conviction did not render the need to train sufficiently “obvious.”14
Connick is significant because it changes the scope of civil
liability with respect to Brady violations. Before Connick, the Court
shielded only individual prosecutors from liability.15 However, after
Connick, arguably an entire district attorney’s office may be shielded
from liability.
The purpose of this Comment is to highlight the hazards that
Connick invites by showing that, with the Court’s holding, there is
no prosecutorial accountability with respect to Brady violations.
Part II of this Comment discusses Connick’s facts, and Part III
examines the Court’s reasoning. Part IV proposes a restorative
approach, which serves to honor values that both the majority’s and
the dissent’s opinions promoted and also to maintain principles from
the core test that City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris16 set forth. Part IV
also argues that, in light of this test, the restorative approach17 will
allow for a fairer outcome in cases that are similar to Connick.
II. STATEMENT OF
THE CASE
In 1985, the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s office charged
John Thompson with murder.18 Media coverage of the murder charge
led victims of an unrelated armed robbery to identify Thompson as
their attacker.19 The district attorney subsequently charged
Thompson with armed robbery as well.20
During the course of the robbery investigation, a crime scene
technician removed from a robbery victim’s pants a swatch of fabric
that was stained with the robber’s blood.21 The technician submitted
the swatch to the lab one week prior to the start of Thompson’s
armed robbery trial.22 When the lab report came back two days

14. Id. at 1360–65.
15. Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 338–39 (2009).
16. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
17. The Author developed the restorative approach specifically to address Connick’s
outcome.
18. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1356.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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before the trial, its results revealed that the robber had type-B
blood.23 Thompson’s trial counsel never learned of this report, and
there is no evidence that investigators ever tested Thompson’s
blood.24
On the first day of the armed robbery trial, Assistant District
Attorney Gerry Deegan checked all of the case’s physical
evidence—including the stained swatch of clothing—out of the
police property room.25 When Deegan later checked all of the
evidence back into the courthouse property room, the stained swatch
was nowhere to be found.26 Neither Deegan nor his fellow
prosecutor, James Williams, ever mentioned the stained swatch or
the crime lab report at trial.27 A few weeks after the jury convicted
Thompson of attempted armed robbery, Thompson chose not to
testify in his own defense during his murder trial because of the
armed robbery conviction.28 The jury convicted Thompson of murder
and then sentenced him to death.29
Thompson unsuccessfully pursued appeals and postconviction
relief for fourteen years; state and federal courts reviewed and denied
his numerous challenges to the murder conviction and to the
sentence.30 In late April 1999, with less than one month to go before
the scheduled execution date, a private investigator discovered the
crime lab report that detailed the findings of the test that had been
done on the stained swatch of clothing from the armed robbery
investigation.31 Thompson’s attorneys quickly tested Thompson’s
blood and discovered that he had type-O blood, meaning that the
blood on the swatch of clothing was not his.32 After news of this lab
report came to light, former Assistant District Attorney Michael
Riehlmann came forward, saying “Deegan had confessed to him in
1994 that he had intentionally suppressed blood evidence in the

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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armed robbery trial of John Thompson that in some way exculpated
the defendant.”33
In light of this new evidence, the district attorney moved to stay
the execution date and to vacate Thompson’s armed robbery
conviction.34 Shortly thereafter, the Louisiana Court of Appeals
reversed the murder conviction, concluding that the armed robbery
conviction had unconstitutionally deprived Thompson of his right to
testify in his own defense during his murder trial.35 The district
attorney retried the murder case against Thompson in 2003.36 The
jury found him not guilty.37
Following his acquittal on the murder charge, Thompson
brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,38 alleging that the district
attorney’s office, Orleans Parish District Attorney Harry Connick,
Williams, and others caused him to be “convicted wrongfully of two
crimes, sentenced to death, nearly executed, and incarcerated for
over eighteen years before being exonerated of both crimes.”39 The
§ 1983 claim asked whether the district attorney’s office violated
principles that the Court had outlined in Brady v. Maryland40 by
failing to disclose the crime lab report from the armed robbery
investigation.41 The case proceeded to trial42 and the jury found the
district attorney’s office liable for failing to train its prosecutors on

33. Id. at 1356 n.1 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although Deegan passed away from
colon cancer in July 1994 without having done anything to remedy the situation, Riehlmann also
neglected to bring Deegan’s misconduct to the attention of the district attorney’s office or the
court until after Thompson’s private investigator discovered the lab report. In re Riehlmann, 891
So. 2d 1239, 1241–42 (La. 2005). The Louisiana Supreme Court ordered that Riehlmann be
publicly reprimanded for his role in the ordeal. Id. at 1249–50.
34. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1356.
35. Id. at 1356–57.
36. Id. at 1357.
37. Id.
38. Thompson’s original complaint against the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office
included claims for malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, civil conspiracy, and direct action pursuant to section 22:655 of Louisiana Revised
Statutes. Complaint at 24–31, Thompson v. Connick, No. 03-2045, 2005 WL 3541035 (E.D. La.
2005). The 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim is the only claim that advanced to trial. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at
1357.
39. Complaint, supra note 38, at 1–2.
40. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). In Brady, the Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution.” Id. at 87.
41. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1357.
42. Id.
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principles that Brady promulgated.43 The jury awarded Thompson
$14 million and the district court added $1 million in fees and
costs.44
A Fifth Circuit panel affirmed the jury’s finding.45 The panel
held that, while Thompson failed to present a pattern of similar
Brady violations within the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s office,
he did not need to prove such a pattern.46 The panel found that
Thompson demonstrated that Connick was on notice of an
obvious need for Brady training by presenting evidence
“that attorneys, often fresh out of law school, would
undoubtedly be required to confront Brady issues while at
the DA’s Office, that erroneous decisions regarding Brady
evidence would result in serious constitutional violations,
that resolution of Brady issues was often unclear, and that
training in Brady would have been helpful.”47
The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, vacated the panel’s decision
and granted a rehearing.48 The en banc court then divided evenly,
thereby affirming the district court.49 At issue within the four
opinions of the divided en banc court was “whether Thompson could
establish municipal liability for [a] failure to train the prosecutors
based on the single Brady violation without proving a prior pattern of
similar violations, and, if so, what evidence would make that
showing.”50 On March 22, 2010, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.51


43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1358.
46. Id.
47. Id. (quoting Thompson v. Connick, 553 F.3d 836, 854 (5th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 131 S. Ct.
1350 (2011)).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Connick v. Thompson, 130 S. Ct. 1880, 1880 (2010) (granting petition for writ of
certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011).
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III. REASONING OF
THE COURT
A. The Majority Opinion
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court and was
joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and
Alito.52 The Court addressed “whether a district attorney’s office
may be held liable under § 1983 for failure to train based on a single
Brady violation.”53 In holding that a district attorney’s office may not
be held liable, the Court used various tests that address a
municipality’s liability under § 1983.54
The Court first outlined 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The text of § 1983
provides a private right of action when an individual who is acting
under color of law deprives another individual of his or her
constitutional rights.55 Then, the Court addressed four main topics:
(1) municipal liability; (2) the requisite standard of fault; (3) patterns
of constitutional violations; and (4) single-incident liability. The
Court considered each topic in evaluating the constitutionality of
Thompson’s § 1983 claim.
1. Municipal Liability
First, the Court defined how a municipality may be held liable
under § 1983. It stated that “[a] municipality or other local
government may be liable under [§ 1983] if the governmental body
itself ‘subjects’ a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes’ a
person ‘to be subjected’ to such deprivation.”56 The Court placed a
limitation on this, however, by stating that, “under § 1983, local
governments are responsible only for ‘their own illegal acts.’”57 The
Court also stated that local governments are “not vicariously liable
under § 1983 for their employees’ actions.”58
Next, Justice Thomas wrote that an “action pursuant to official
municipal policy” must have caused the plaintiff’s injury in order for

52. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1355.
53. Id. at 1356.
54. Id. at 1358–66 (emphasis added).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
56. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1359 (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692
(1978)).
57. Id. (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986)).
58. Id.
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a local government to be liable under § 1983.59 Such actions under
municipal policy include “the decisions of a government’s
lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so
persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law.”60
The Court acknowledged that there may be limited circumstances in
which a local government’s decision not to train employees about the
legal duty to avoid violating a citizen’s constitutional rights may
qualify as an official government policy for § 1983 purposes.61 In
addition, the Court pointed out that municipal culpability for
deprivation of rights is “most tenuous where a claim turns on a
failure to train.”62
2. “Deliberate Indifference”
Standard of Fault
In addressing the “deliberate indifference” standard of fault, the
Court referenced Canton. The Court stated that, in order to satisfy
§ 1983, “a municipality’s failure to train its employees . . . must
amount to ‘deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom
the untrained employees come into contact.’”63
The “deliberate indifference” standard of fault is a stringent
standard because it requires proof “that a municipal actor disregarded
a known or obvious consequence of his action.”64 Thus, city
policymakers must be on actual or constructive notice that a certain
oversight in a training program results in city employees violating
citizens’ constitutional rights.65 If policymakers thereafter choose to
retain and maintain the defective program, then the city may be
deemed “deliberately indifferent.”66 The Court further qualified its
definition of this standard of fault by stating that, if a city has notice
that its program will result or does result in constitutional violations,
and it then adopts a “policy of inaction” regarding that program, then
the city functionally violates the U.S. Constitution.67 But without any

59. Id. (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1359 (quoting City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)) (internal
brackets omitted).
64. Id. at 1360 (citing Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997)).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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notice that training programs are deficient in certain respects,
decision makers cannot be pegged as having deliberately chosen
certain programs that resulted in constitutional violations.68
The Court declined to adopt any standard of fault that is less
stringent than the “deliberate indifference” standard is on the
asserted basis that anything less would result in municipalities being
held responsible under the respondeat superior liability theory.69
Respondeat superior liability, a tort doctrine, holds an employer
responsible for the wrongful acts of an employee or agent if the acts
occur within the scope of employment.70
3. Patterns of
Constitutional Violations
The next section of the Court’s analysis addressed patterns of
constitutional violations. To demonstrate deliberate indifference
based on a failure to train employees, there must be a pattern of
similar constitutional violations by inadequately trained employees.71
The core of this analysis involves policymakers’ actions: if
policymakers continue to adhere to an approach that they know leads
to constitutional violations, then there is deliberate indifference that
establishes municipal liability.72
The Court acknowledged that, in the ten years preceding
Thompson’s armed robbery trial, Louisiana courts overturned four
convictions due to Brady violations that Connick’s prosecutors had
committed.73 The Court stated that these four cases74 did not put
Connick on notice of a deficient training program because the
incidents at issue were not similar to the one that was at issue in

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Cornell Univ. Law Sch., Respondeat Superior Overview, LEGAL INFORMATION
INSTITUTE (Aug. 19, 2010, 5:23 PM), http://topics.law.cornell.edu/wex/respondeat_superior.
71. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1360.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Thompson’s original complaint points to several prior instances where Brady violations
committed by Connick’s office resulted in convictions being overturned, and to several instances
of alleged Brady violations. Complaint, supra note 38, at 21–24. Connick asserted that none of
the four overturned convictions involved intentional suppression of evidence. Thompson v.
Connick, 578 F.3d 293, 303 n.50 (5th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011). The trial court
ruled in favor of the state in all four cases, but the Louisiana Supreme Court overruled each of the
trial court’s rulings. Id. The subsequent appellate and U.S. Supreme Court opinions are unclear as
to exactly what type of Brady violations occurred. Id. at 305–06.
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Thompson’s case.75 Because none of those incidences involved a
failure to disclose blood evidence, a crime lab report, or any kind of
scientific evidence,76 Connick could not have known that specific
training was necessary to avoid a constitutional violation similar to
the one that Thompson experienced.77
4. Single-Incident
Liability
Justice Thomas pointed out that Thompson relied on the singleincident liability test from Canton instead of establishing a case
based on a pattern of similar violations.78 The Canton Court wanted
to maintain the possibility that unconstitutional consequences of the
failure to train employees may be “so patently obvious” that a
plaintiff need not prove a pattern of violations for a court to hold a
city liable under § 1983.79 To do so, the Canton Court posed a
hypothetical in a footnote: if city policymakers know to a moral
certainty that police officers will have to arrest fleeing suspects, and
the city has armed its officers with firearms to accomplish this task,
then the need to train police officers with respect to constitutional
limits on the use of deadly force is obvious.80 It follows then, that if
the city fails to train the police officers, the failure constitutes a
deliberate indifference to constitutional rights.81 Thus, according to
this hypothetical, a plaintiff does not necessarily need to prove a
pattern of violations in order to bring a successful § 1983 claim.
The Court stated that Thompson’s case did not fall within such a
narrow scope of single-incident liability.82 The Court distinguished
Canton’s hypothetical by stating that police officers need a level of
legal training that they would not acquire other than through a city’s
training program.83 This situation differs from that in the legal world,
where, in order to graduate from law school and pass the state bar
examination, attorneys-to-be must know how to find, apply, and

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1360.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1360–61.
Id. at 1361.
City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 n.10 (1989).
Id.
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1361.
Id.





Winter 2012]

CONNICK V. THOMPSON

527

understand legal rules, a type of training that differentiates them
from average public employees.84 Thus, the majority reasoned, any
recurring constitutional violations cannot be an “obvious
consequence” of a failure to provide prosecutors in the district
attorney’s office with training regarding how to obey the law.85
Licensed attorneys simply do not present the same constitutional
danger that was inherent in Canton’s untrained hypothetical police
officers.86
The Court then addressed a second difference between the
prosecutors in Thompson’s case and the officers in Canton—the
nuance of the necessary training.87 The Court stated that Connick’s
prosecutors did have general knowledge about Brady.88 Thus,
Thompson must have asserted that Connick failed to train his
prosecutors on the particular Brady issue related to his case.89 But,
because “deliberate indifference” does not acknowledge this type of
nuance,90 and because a plaintiff will always be able to point to
something that a city could have done,91 Thompson’s claim did not
rise to the level that would prompt municipal liability.92
Because Thompson’s claims did not fall within the range of
Canton’s single-incident liability that would provide an exception to
the requirement that a plaintiff show a pattern of violations to prove
deliberate indifference,93 the Court reversed the Fifth Circuit’s
judgment and found Connick and the Orleans Parish District
Attorney’s Office not liable for § 1983 constitutional violations.
B. The Concurrence
Justice Scalia delivered the only concurrence in the case, and
Justice Alito joined him.94 Although Justice Scalia joined the
majority opinion in full, his concurrence also addressed causation.95

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 1361–63.
Id. at 1363.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1366.
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 1368.
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Justice Scalia stated that a plaintiff must meet a rigorous causation
standard in order to recover from a municipality under § 1983.96
According to Justice Scalia, Thompson was unable to demonstrate
the “direct causal link between the municipal action and the
deprivation of federal rights.”97 Riehlmann’s suppression of the
crime lab report precipitated the deprivation of Thompson’s
constitutional rights, not Connick’s failure to train the district
attorneys.98 Because Deegan’s violation was his and his alone,
Connick could not have been on notice that he needed to instruct his
prosecutors on turning over evidence whose inculpatory or
exculpatory character was unknown.99
C. The Dissent
Justice Ginsburg delivered the dissent, and Justices Breyer,
Sotomayor, and Kagan joined her.100 Justice Ginsburg performed a
thorough examination of the record to determine that Connick and
members of the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office did not
understand Brady’s scope and thus were inadequately educated about
Brady’s disclosure obligations.101 The dissent argued that the
evidence demonstrated that the district attorney’s office bore
responsibility under § 1983.102
The dissent first addressed the numerous Brady violations that
occurred throughout Thompson’s trials.103 First, initial eyewitness
reports described the assailant as a six-foot-tall African American
with close-cut hair.104 Thompson was five-feet-eight-inches tall and
styled his hair in a large Afro at the time of the murder.105 The police
reports that detailed the witnesses’ identifications were never
disclosed to the court or to Thompson.106 Second, the crime lab’s test
on the swatch of clothing from the armed robbery trial revealed that

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1369.
Id. at 1370 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1371.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the perpetrator had type-B blood.107 However, no one forwarded the
results to the court, and later tests showed that Thompson had type-O
blood.108 Third, Richard Perkins, the man whose testimony helped to
convict Thompson of murder, came forward only after the victim’s
family offered him a reward.109 After receiving assurances that the
family wanted to try to “help” him,110 Perkins said that Thompson
was involved in the murder.111 The recordings that detailed Perkins’s
exchange with the family “did not come to light until long after
Thompson’s trials.”112 Finally, the dissent pointed out that, in
preparation for the armed robbery trial, Thompson’s counsel
requested “access to all materials and information ‘favorable to the
defendant’ and ‘material and relevant to the issue of guilt or
punishment,’ as well as ‘any results or reports’ of ‘scientific tests or
experiments.’”113 Not even Connick disputed that the failure to
disclose the swatch and the crime lab report fell short of compliance
with Brady114 and with the discovery request.
Next, the dissent focused on Deegan’s actions that prevented
defense counsel from having access to the evidence.115 Not only did
defense counsel never find out about the swatch or its removal from
the property room, the swatch was never returned to the property
room after trial.116 To this day, it has never been recovered.117
The dissent stated that, because of the order-of-trial strategy
(first robbery trial, then murder trial), the district attorney’s office
constrained Thompson’s options with respect to testifying in his own
defense at his murder trial.118 As a result, the testimony of witnesses
adverse to Thompson “gained force” and the lack of evidence that

107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. The police documented on tape that Perkins stated to the victim’s family that he did
not mind helping them catch the perpetrator, but that he would like the family to help him. Id.
The family told Perkins that they wanted to help him. Id. Only then did Perkins name Thompson.
Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1371 n.2.
113. Id. at 1372 (referencing exhibits entered into evidence).
114. Id. at 1372 n.4.
115. Id. at 1372–73.
116. Id. at 1373.
117. Id.
118. Id. Thompson’s decision to not testify was a strategic decision. If Thompson had
testified in his murder trial, the district attorney could have impeached his testimony with the
armed robbery conviction. Id.
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was available to the defense to impeach those witnesses119 helped to
seal Thompson’s conviction.120
All of this, the dissent stated, amounted to a clear showing of
deliberate indifference as Canton specified.121 Justice Ginsburg
concluded that Thompson had presented convincing evidence that
both satisfied Canton’s standard122 and showed that Brady training
was absolutely necessary for Connick’s prosecutors because
(1) Connick, the Office’s sole policymaker, misunderstood
Brady. (2) Other leaders in the Office, who bore direct
responsibility for training less experienced prosecutors,
were similarly uninformed about Brady. (3) Prosecutors in
the Office received no Brady training. (4) The Office
shirked its responsibility to keep prosecutors abreast of
relevant
legal
developments
concerning
Brady
requirements.123
Given these shortcomings, the dissent believed that it was hardly
surprising that Brady violations occurred and that the integrity of
Thompson’s trials was seriously undermined.124 Furthermore,
respondeat superior liability does not equal deliberate indifference
liability.125 The dissent asserted that Connick was not directly
responsible because he hired prosecutors who violated Brady;126 he
was directly responsible because of his own deliberate indifference
to providing crucial training.127


119. The police not only failed to turn over police reports with initial descriptions that did not
match Thompson but prosecutors also failed to produce the tapes that recorded Perkins’s
conversation with the victim’s family in the murder case. Id. at 1374. As a result, defense counsel
could not cast doubt on Perkins’s credibility. Id. In addition, the prosecution failed to disclose a
police report that contained Perkins’s account of what he learned from Thompson’s codefendant
in the case. Id. The police report revealed that the codefendant’s testimony on the stand was
“materially inconsistent” with previously relayed information. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1376.
122. Id. at 1377.
123. Id. at 1378.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1387 n.28.
126. Id.
127. Id. The dissent went on to state that “the buck stops with him.” Id. at 1387.
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IV. ANALYSIS
Before Connick, only individual prosecutors had absolute
immunity from liability under § 1983;128 unfortunately, it now
appears that entire district attorney offices and the district attorney
himself will be immune from Brady claim lawsuits. The harm from
this ruling is that Thompson spent more than eighteen years in
prison, fourteen of them on death row, before he was exonerated for
the armed robbery and murder convictions. This harm must be
addressed.
The majority’s instinct to avoid imposing respondeat superior
liability was the correct instinct. Respondeat superior liability would
implicate state budgets at a time when budgets are already stretched
thin. But, the majority opinion failed to capture the spirit of § 1983
because it did not acknowledge the need to redress Thompson’s
harm—and the harm that would stem from any future Brady
violations. Providing a constitutional right to a remedy is the only
way to redress this harm.129
The majority and dissent failed to engage in a true debate and,
consequently, there was no real resolution of the issues. The two
opinions together appear to promote three main values: the need to
avoid respondeat superior liability, the need for deterrence, and the
need for reparations. Justice Thomas’s decision focused on rejecting

128. Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 342 (2009) (holding that “the immunity that
the law grants prosecutors is ‘absolute’”).
129. The federal government, the District of Columbia, and twenty-seven states have enacted
some form of legislation that addresses wrongful convictions or wrongful imprisonment.
Compensating the Wrongly Convicted, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocence
project.org/Content/Compensating_The_Wrongly_Convicted.php (last visited Aug. 21, 2011);
see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2513 (2006); ALA. CODE § 29-2-150 (2011); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 4900–
4906 (West 2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-102uu (2011); D.C. CODE § 2-423 (2011); FLA.
STAT. § 961.06 (2011); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/8(c) (2011); IOWA CODE § 663A.1 (2011);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8 (2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 8241–8244 (2011);
MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 10-501 (West 2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258D,
§ 5(A) (2011); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-44-7 (2011); MO. REV. STAT. § 650.055(9) (2011);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-1-214 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-4601 to -4608 (2011); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 541-B:14 (2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C1-5 (West 2011); N.Y. CT. CL. ACT
§ 8-b (McKinney 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 148-82 to -84 (2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 2305.02, 2305.49, 2743.48 (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 154 (2011); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 9-8-108(a)(7) (2011); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.001 (Vernon 2011);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-405 (2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 5572 (2009); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-195.11 (2011); W. VA. CODE § 14-2-13a (2011); WIS. STAT. § 775.05 (2011). No matter
how inadequate the respective compensation may seem, receiving some compensation is better
than receiving none at all. If the Louisiana statute (which was enacted in 2005) had been in place
at the time when Thompson brought his claims, this lawsuit likely never would have happened.
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respondeat superior liability. In contrast, Justice Ginsburg’s decision
highlighted the need for deterrence and reparations, with the idea
that, as a society, we should compensate an individual who spends
fourteen years on death row and more than eighteen years total in
prison.
A court that applies a restorative approach will be more effective
in taking both Justice Thomas’s and Justice Ginsburg’s concerns into
consideration, while at the same time honoring the three values of
deterrence, reparations, and avoidance of respondeat superior
liability. By focusing on the core principles of Canton and having a
more “totality of the circumstances” and restorative approach
(instead of concentrating on deliberate indifference), a court will be
able to have a much more holistic understanding of the facts of a
given case, and the outcome will be more commensurate with what a
plaintiff deserves. Additionally, district attorneys’ offices will be
forced to adhere to a higher standard of accountability.
The Canton test has several prongs. The test asks whether (1)
“there is a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom
and the alleged constitutional deprivation[;]”130 (2) “the
[municipality’s] failure to train amounts to a deliberate indifference
toward the rights” of its inhabitants;131 (3) “[the] inadequate training
[may] justifiably be said to represent ‘city policy[;]’”132 and (4)
“the . . . deficiency in a city’s training program must be closely
related to the [plaintiff’s] injury.”133 By taking all of these elements
into consideration, a court will be able to appropriately redress harm
under § 1983.
A. Prong 1:
A Causal Link
Sometimes it might be difficult to connect the street-level actor
with the municipality because there is a spatial disconnect between
the person who implements the policy and the municipal body.134 So,
for a municipality to be held liable, a plaintiff must be able to

130. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989).
131. Id. at 388.
132. Id. at 390.
133. Id. at 391.
134. Teressa E. Ravenell, Blame It on the Man: Theorizing the Relationship Between § 1983
Municipal Liability and the Qualified Immunity Defense, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 153, 169–70
(2011).
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attribute the harm to an act performed by a person who is authorized
to act on the municipality’s behalf.135 A court must also be willing to
attribute the plaintiff’s injury to that municipal actor.136 A more
direct connection between the deprivation of the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights and the municipal policy comes from the idea
that a municipality “acted” by adopting its chosen policy or by
neglecting to adopt a policy at all (rather than a new or different
one).137 A new or different policy would have prevented the lowerlevel municipal actor—like a prosecutor—from engaging in
unconstitutional conduct.138
Applying this to Thompson’s case, a new or different policy
regarding Brady training would have prevented Connick’s lowerlevel prosecutor from suppressing evidence and engaging in
unconstitutional behavior. With new or different training, Connick’s
prosecutors might have been more aware of their moral,
constitutional, and ethical responsibility to disclose the exculpatory
materials.139 Thus, there was a causal link between the harm that
Thompson suffered and Connick’s prosecutor who was authorized to
act on behalf of the district attorney’s office.
B. Prong 2:
Deliberate Indifference
Staying true to Canton’s language, a court should next consider
that a failure-to-train claim must amount to deliberate indifference to
be a city “policy or custom” that is actionable under § 1983.140 That
is, the failure to train must be a deliberate or conscious choice made
from various alternatives.141 To determine if the policymaker—such

135. Id. at 170.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 170–71.
138. Id.
139. Prosecutors have a moral, ethical, and professional responsibility to disclose exculpatory
material. See Rachel E. Barkow, Organizational Guidelines for the Prosecutor’s Office, 31
CARDOZO L. REV. 2089, 2093–95 (2010). In his concurrence, Justice Scalia argued that
Thompson could not meet the causation standard because the suppression of evidence arose from
Deegan’s willful actions to keep the evidence out, not from the failure to train by the district
attorney’s office. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1368 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring).
However, this willful suppression could very well have been a result of the lack of training.
Perhaps training would have dissuaded Deegan from willfully suppressing the exculpatory
evidence.
140. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989).
141. Id.
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as Connick—made a choice not to train (and, thus, not to supervise)
based on alternatives, a court must look back to the course of the
policymaker’s actions.
As the dissent pointed out, Connick demonstrated that he knew
of the need to educate his prosecutors on Brady when he testified in
the trial that “he relied on [his] supervisors . . . to ensure prosecutors
were familiar with their Brady obligations.”142 Then, his testimony
revealed that he indeed made a choice among alternatives because
“[he] did not inquire whether the supervisors themselves understood
the importance of teaching newer prosecutors about Brady.”143
Not only did Connick not inquire into whether his supervisors
knew about the importance of Brady (even though he relied on them
to teach Brady to his newer prosecutors), he did not keep himself
abreast of new opinions and legal rules. He acknowledged during the
trial that “he had stopped reading law books . . . and looking at
opinions when he was first elected District Attorney in 1974.”144
Making a decision to not read law books and recent legal opinions is
a choice among alternatives—one may either continue to actively
engage in continuing legal education or may instead decide to cease
continuing legal education. Thus, Connick, as the policymaker and
district attorney for the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office,
made a “deliberate or conscious choice” to not educate himself or his
fellow prosecutors on constantly evolving Brady principles. This is
enough to establish deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights
that Brady promulgated.
C. Prong 3: Inadequate
Training as City Policy
The Canton Court acknowledged that it might seem
counterintuitive to think that a municipality would have a policy of
failing to train its employees.145 However, the Court stated that it
may be that, “in light of the duties assigned to specific . . . employees
the need for more or different training is so obvious” that
policymakers were deliberately indifferent to a need for training.146

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1380 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Canton, 489 U.S. at 390.
Id.
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And, in the event that a city or municipality failed to provide training
when its need was “so obvious,” the failure to train may represent a
policy that the city is responsible for.147 Furthermore, the city may be
held liable if the failure to train actually causes injury.148
By applying this language directly to the facts of Thompson’s
case, a court would be able to determine that Connick had a policy of
no training at all. But, given the circumstances, and in light of a
prosecutor’s importance in the criminal justice process, the need for
training on principles that ensure due process149 is “obvious.” The
majority even pointed out that “[p]rosecutors have a special duty to
seek justice, not merely to convict”150 and that they also have
“unique ethical obligations” that include a duty to turn over Brady
evidence to the defense.151 Considering that Brady evidence involves
a “special duty” and “unique ethical obligations,”152 prosecutors
must be trained in Brady principles in order to fulfill their roles in
seeking justice.153 Thus, according to Canton, since Connick and the
district attorney’s office did not provide this “obviously necessary”
training, the failure to train is a policy that the district attorney was
responsible for. The responsibility is only bolstered by the fact that
Thompson indeed suffered injury due to the failure-to-train policy—
an injury that spanned more than eighteen years in prison.
D. Prong 4: The Relationship
Between the Deficiency and the Injury
Finally, a court will have to evaluate whether the deficient
program was closely related to the plaintiff’s injury.154 The Canton
Court asked whether the injury would have been avoided if the
employee had been trained in a program that was not deficient in the

147. Id.
148. Id.
149. For a recent example of how Brady protects due process, see Cone v. Bell, 129 S. Ct.
1769, 1772 (2009) (stating that the Court held in Brady that “when a State suppresses evidence
favorable to an accused that is material to guilt or to punishment, the State violates the
defendant’s right to due process, ‘irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution’”
(quoting Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963))).
150. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1362 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1365 (“The role of a prosecutor is to see that justice is done.” (citing Berger v.
United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935))).
154. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391 (1989).
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identified manner.155 Canton acknowledged that predicting an
employee’s actions would be difficult since matters of judgment may
be involved,156 but the Court had confidence that a judge and a jury
would be able to adequately evaluate the situation.157
Here, it arguably is difficult to know what the prosecutor would
have done with the swatch of clothing if he had been properly trained
in Brady. However, it would not be unreasonable for a judge and a
jury to find that, if Deegan, the district attorney, had been trained in
Brady, he would have known better than to intentionally suppress the
crime lab report that indicated that the perpetrator had type-B blood.
This type of finding would be more than sufficient to qualify under
Canton’s guidelines.
V. CONCLUSION
By applying each prong of Canton’s test to the facts of a case
and by using a restorative approach, a court will be able to consider
the totality of the circumstances in deciding whether a § 1983
plaintiff may succeed in his claim. The Connick majority erred by
being too restrictive on the deliberate indifference prong, and the
dissent erred by not explaining how its analysis fit into the larger
picture of what Canton means and stands for.
Going back to Canton’s roots with this restorative approach
gives the truest and fairest outcome for a case like Thompson’s.
Admittedly, this approach is more simplistic than the majority’s
approach. However, sometimes simplicity is necessary. Evaluating a
case by going step by step through the restorative approach will keep
a court’s analysis consistent and predictable. Consistency and
predictability are important because the consequences that stem from
Connick are widespread. If district attorneys know that they are not
going to be held financially accountable for withholding Brady
evidence, they will have an incentive to continue withholding the
evidence in order to win cases. This is a situation that the justice
system cannot allow because it will lead to executions in cases where
miracles like John Thompson’s will not happen.

155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.

